Apply current exponential de Finetti theorem to realistic quantum key
  distribution by Zhao, Yi-Bo et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
9.
26
83
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
8 J
an
 20
09
Apply current exponential de Finetti theorem to realistic quantum key distribution
Yi-Bo Zhao,∗ Zheng-Fu Han, and Guang-Can Guo
Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, (CAS), Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
In the realistic quantum key distribution (QKD), Alice and Bob respectively get a quantum
state from an unknown channel, whose dimension may be unknown. However, while discussing the
security, sometime we need to know exact dimension, since current exponential de Finetti theorem,
crucial to the information-theoretical security proof, is deeply related with the dimension and can
only be applied to finite dimensional case. Here we address this problem in detail. We show that
if POVM elements corresponding to Alice and Bob’s measured results can be well described in a
finite dimensional subspace with sufficiently small error, then dimensions of Alice and Bob’s states
can be almost regarded as finite. Since the security is well defined by the smooth entropy, which
is continuous with the density matrix, the small error of state actually means small change of
security. Then the security of unknown-dimensional system can be solved. Finally we prove that
for heterodyne detection continuous variable QKD and differential phase shift QKD, the collective
attack is optimal under the infinite key size case.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION:
Information-theoretical security proof [1] is a powerful
and general way to prove the security for quantum key
distribution (QKD). In this method, to give the amount
of unconditional secret keys, we only need to discuss up-
per or lower bounds of some entropies. The exponential
de Finetti theorem is crucial to this method, which sup-
port that as the key size goes to infinite, Eve cannot get
more information from the coherent attack than from the
collective attack [1]. Since in the collective attack Eve at-
tacks each signal independently with the same method,
it is much easy for us to discuss the security. However,
current exponential de Finetti theorem relying on the di-
mension and even diverges if the dimension is infinite,
while in practice the dimension is often unknown or infi-
nite.
There are also some other kind of quantum de Finetti
theorems. In Ref. [2, 3, 4], several de Finetti theorems for
different conditions are given. These de Finetti theorems
can be independent with the dimension. Even under the
infinite dimensional case, they still converge. However,
These de Finetti theorems are polynomial and not ex-
ponential. As the key size goes to infinite, they can not
exponentially converge to zero. Whether such polyno-
mial de Finetti theorems can be applied to QKD requires
further discussion.
We can think about a more general case. Alice and Bob
respectively get a quantum state from a channel and do
measurement and thus hold classical data finally. Real-
istically, they only know the classical data and do not
know anything about the dimension of quantum state
beforehand. Therefore, it is not realistic for us to as-
sume the dimension before discussing the security. If the
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dimension of quantum state is unknown, current expo-
nential de Finetti theorem may not be directly applied
and the security against the most general attack is diffi-
cult to given by the information-theoretical method. In
Ref. [5], Renner gave some concrete examples to show
the de Finetti theorem. From these examples we can
see that if the dimension of individual quantum state
is higher than the block size, the whole state may be
far away from an almost i.i.d. state. For some QKDs,
the dimension problem can be solved by introducing the
squashing model [6, 7]. However for some other protocols
we do not know whether there exist a squashing model,
i.e. continuous variable (CV) QKD [8, 9] and differen-
tial phase shift (DPS) QKD [10]. Then, it is necessary
for Alice and Bob to get some information about their
dimensions.
Here we give a general way to estimate the effective
dimension (In the following we will see that Alice and
Bob’s measurement data are obtained almost only from
a finite dimensional subspace. Here we call the dimen-
sion of this subspace as effective dimension.) of a system,
and a general method to apply current information theo-
retical security proof to practical QKD. Finally we prove
that if POVM elements corresponding to Alice and Bob’s
measured results can be well described in a finite dimen-
sional subspace with sufficiently small error, the security
of unknown dimensional system is very close to that of a
finite dimensional system, where Alice and Bob put finite
dimensional filters before their detectors. The security of
this finite dimensional system is covered by current in-
formation theoretical security proof method. Then the
security of unknown-dimensional system can be solved.
Our solution is based on the estimation of the effective
dimension of a system. In Ref. [11], Wehner et al. gave
an estimation to the lower bound of the dimension of a
system. We hope future works can shrink the gap be-
tween these two results. Up to now, some efforts have
been done for the finite key size case [12, 13]. The se-
2curity under finite key size case may be much different
from that under infinite key size case. To give a better
result for finite key size case, it is necessary to give a tight
estimation to the effective dimension.
We may think that the world is always finite, so re-
gard it as guaranteed that current exponential de Finetti
theorem can be directly applied to practical system. It is
not necessary the case. Firstly, finite measurement result
does not always mean finite dimensional quantum state.
A finite measurement result can also be generated from
an infinite quantum state. Secondly, to know the upper
bound of the dimension of quantum state is required if
we consider the finite key size case. From the Ref. [1]
we know that the amount of secret key rate under the
finite key size case is deeply related with the dimension.
Our estimation of effective dimension is expected to be
favorable to finite key size situation.
We noted two parallel works shown in Ref. [14, 15]. In
these two works, the unconditional security of CVQKD
is addressed. In Ref. [14], Renner et al. modified pre-
vious exponential de Finetti theorem and this new theo-
rem can be directly applied to CVQKD. From this new
de Finetti theorem we can see that in CVQKD if the
variance of Bob’s measurement result is finite, the state
Alice, Bob and Eve share can still be approximated by
an almost i.i.d. state. Our result only works for hetero-
dyne CVQKD and requires the maximum value of Al-
ice and Bob’s heterodyne detection to be finite. Under
the infinite key size case, our result can give the same
approximation that the state describes the whole infi-
nite communications can be approximated by an almost
product state with arbitrarily small error. In Ref. [15],
Leverrier et al. directly addressed the unconditional se-
curity of CVQKD without the de Finetti theorem. Their
work is based on the Gaussian optimality. In this paper
we approximate the CVQKD by a finite dimension pro-
tocol. The security of finite dimension protocol can be
covered by current information theoretical security proof.
Then the unconditional security of CVQKD is possible
to prove. Compared with these two works, one advan-
tage of our work is its application to photon number de-
tection protocols, e.g. another coherent state protocol,
DPSQKD. In the following, we will demonstrate how to
apply our result to DPSQKD.
The basic idea of our approach is as following. Al-
though the dimension of quantum state Alice, Bob and
Eve initially share is totally unknown, after obtaining
measurement results, Alice and Bob collapse Eve’s state
into a less complex state and can know some information
about the effective dimension of their state. Then we
can construct another finite dimensional protocol, where
Alice and Bob put a finite dimensional filter right be-
fore their detection equipments that can filter out high
dimensional components. We prove that final state of
this new finite dimensional protocol is only slightly dif-
ferent from the original one. Then the security of that
unknown-dimensional protocol can be approximated by
this new protocol. The security of this new finite dimen-
sional protocol is covered by Ref. [1], then the security
of that unknown-dimensional protocol can be solved.
In the following we will introduce a general QKD
protocol at first and then discuss unknown-dimensional
problem. Latter we will introduce a finite dimensional
protocol and prove that if components of POVM ele-
ments corresponding to Alice and Bob’s measured results
on high dimensional bases are small enough then the se-
curity of original unknown-dimensional protocol can be
well approximated by this finite dimensional protocol.
While discussing their difference, we will introduce an
entanglement version measurement to describe Alice and
Bob’s detection. Finally some application examples will
be given. In application examples, we will only discuss
the infinite key size case, while our result is also useful
under the finite key size case.
II. PROTOCOL:
Here we limit our analysis to the following protocol.
Alice and Bob take N quantum states from a chan-
nel respectively. Then they permute their subsystem
according to a commonly chosen random permutation.
They separate N states into l blocks and perform POVM
measurement to each state. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume Alice and Bob respectively hold several
POVMs,MAi = {MAixi } andMBi = {MBiyi } (i = 1, ..., l),
where xi and yi denote corresponding measurement re-
sults, and they perform the POVM MAi = {MAixi } and
MBi = {MBiyi } to the i-th blocks (we assume the choice of
POVMs is publicly known). Then they publish measure-
ment results from the first block to estimate the channel.
Before the classical procedure they estimate the dimen-
sion of their quantum state according to the region of
their measurement results. Then they give up partial of
their measurement results (required by the information-
theoretical security proof [1]) and finally obtain classical
strings. After performing data processing, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification, they finally gen-
erate secret keys. Here, we allow Alice and Bob to hold
several POVMs, mainly because in many QKD protocols,
Alice and Bob need to randomly change their measure-
ment bases. One POVM corresponds to one choice of
bases.
From current de Finetti theorem we know that if the
dimension of the channel is finite, the state Alice, Bob
and Eve share after many communications is close to an
almost product state. It has been shown that such al-
most product state almost has the same property with
the product state. The product state corresponds to the
collective attack. Then we only need to consider collec-
tive attack [1]. However, if the dimension is infinite, the
de Finetti theorem may diverge. Then we cannot know
the difference between collective attack and coherent at-
tack.
We assume after getting quantum state, Alice, Bob and
Eve share the state ρANBNEN . Since discarding subsys-
3tem never increases mutual information, we can safely
assume that Eve holds the purification of ρANBNEN , so
that ρANBNEN is pure [1, 8, 16]. After measuring all
N states, Alice and Bob know the region of their mea-
surement results. For example, in DPSQKD [10], if they
use photon number resolving detector, they can know the
maximum photon number they received from one pulse.
In CVQKD [9] with heterodyne detection, they can know
the maximum amplitude they get. Here, we will show
that such information is enough for Alice and Bob to
know whether their system can be approximated by a
finite dimensional system.
Alice and Bob can make an initial estimation to their
state according to measurement results. After Alice and
Bob knows the region of their measurement results, they
can only consider such ρANBNEN that can generate their
measured results with probability higher than certain
small parameter ε. Then the collection of states they
need to consider is largely reduced. The insecure proba-
bility introduced by such method is no larger than ε and
the strength of security will be reduced by ε [17]. This
procedure is required by our proof.
More precisely, we assume Alice and Bob’s measure-
ment results from a single state of i-th block belong to
the region Ξ(X i) and Ξ(Y i) respectively. We let
DAi =
∑
xi∈Ξ(Xi)
MAixi
DBi =
∑
yi∈Ξ(Y i)
MBiyi
Then DAi and DBi actually are POVM elements that
correspond to Alice and Bob’s measurement results be-
longing to the region Ξ(X i) and Ξ(Y i) respectively. DAi
(DBi) may be different for different blocks. To avoid dis-
tinguishing different DAis (DBis), here we define POVM
elements, D˜A and D˜B satisfying that for arbitrary state
ρ and i, we always have
tr(D˜Aρ) ≥ tr(DAiρ)
tr(D˜Bρ) ≥ tr(DBiρ) (1)
To know the requirement given in Eq. (1) well, we can
see some examples. It can be seen that D˜A = I is one
trivial element that always satisfy Eq. (1). Also, if all
DAis are just the same, D˜A = DAi is the one satisfying
Eq. (1). Furthermore, since for any i and arbitrary ρ,
the expectation value of D˜A − DAi and D˜B − DBi are
non-negative, D˜A−DAi and D˜B−DBi are non-negative
operators. Therefore, if D˜A − DAi and D˜B − DBi are
not zero, they are also valid POVM elements. Then
{DAi, D˜A−DAi, I− D˜A} and {DBi, D˜B−DBi, I− D˜B}
constitute a POVM respectively (It should be noted that
I may be an operation of an infinite dimensional space.).
Here we define the POVM elements D˜A and D˜B mainly
because the maximum value of measurement result of dif-
ferent blocks may be different and then DAis are not the
same. Nevertheless, for most of current protocols, it is
not difficult to find a tight D˜A and D˜B. For example, in
the heterodyne detection CVQKD, Alice and Bob do not
change the basis, so there are only two blocks, one used
for parameter estimation, one used to generate secret
keys. We assume at Alice’s side the maximum value of
one block is V max 1A , and that of the other is V
max 2
A . Then
DA1 =
∑
xi≤V max 1
A
MA1xi and D
A2 =
∑
xi≤V max 2
A
MA2xi .
Since Alice uses the same POVM for these two blocks,
we haveMA1xi =M
A2
xi . If V
max 1
A > V
max 2
A , we can choose
D˜A =
∑
xi≤V max 1
A
MA1xi , which satisfies Eq. (1). Then
D˜A−DA1 = 0 and D˜A−DA2 = ∑V max 2A <xi≤V max 1A MA1xi ,
which is a POVM element. In the DPSQKD, Bob also
does not change his bases, so a similar result can be ob-
tained.
To analysis the security we can only consider the state
ρANBNEN that satisfies
tr[(D˜AD˜B)⊗NρANBNEN ] ≥ ε (2)
while the final strength of security will be reduced by
ε, where D˜A and D˜B are properly chosen elements that
satisfy Eq. (1). Then the collection of ρANBNEN we
need to consider is largely reduced. It can be seen that
to shrink the collection of ρANBNEN , we need to find
tight D˜A and D˜B. In the following, we will see that this
technique is required by our argument.
After Alice and Bob’s measurement, the state Alice,
Bob and Eve hold becomes ρXNY NEN , where X and
Y are classical variable that can take the value xi and
yi and can be expressed by orthogonal quantum state
[1]. Actually, the security of QKD system directly re-
lated to the state ρXNY NEN , rather than original state
ρANBNEN . Therefore, if we can find a finite dimensional
system that generates another state ρ˜XNY NEN very close
to ρXNY NEN , then the security of the original unknown
system can be approximated by this finite dimensional
system.
Now we can compare two schemes as illustrated in Fig.
1. One is the original unknown-dimensional scheme, and
the other is a modified scheme, in which Alice and Bob
respectively put filters before their detectors. We assume
these two filters can totally filter out high dimensional
component of received state and dimensions of output
states of these two filters are dA and dB respectively. For
convenience, we will call the original protocol as protocol
1 and the modified one as protocol 2. Then in the proto-
col 2 dimensions of Alice and Bob’s received states are dA
and dB respectively. In the following, we will see that if
we properly set the filter and choose high enough dA and
dB, then the security of protocol 1 can be approximated
by that of protocol 2.
To simplify our discussion, it is necessary to avoid dis-
tinguishing different blocks. We know that D˜A−DAi and
D˜B −DBi are also POVM elements. Here we introduce
other two classical data x′i and y′i that correspond to
POVM elements D˜A −DAi and D˜B −DBi respectively.
Then in protocol 1 Alice and Bob’s measurement results
4FIG. 1: Illustration of protocol 1 and protocol 2, where in pro-
tocol 2 finite dimensional filters are put before the detectors.
If the filters are properly chosen, the security of protocol 1 can
be well approximated by that of protocol 2, while the security
of protocol 2 is covered by current information theoretical se-
curity proof method. The exact difference between protocol 1
and protocol 2 becomes significant while we consider the the
finite key size case.
of i-th block are within the region Ξ(X i) ∪ {x′i} and
Ξ(Y i) ∪ {y′i} respectively. Therefore, this protocol does
not change if it runs as follows. While getting measure-
ment results from a state of i-th block, Alice and Bob ac-
cept them only when they belong to region Ξ(X i)∪{x′i}
and Ξ(Y i) ∪ {y′i} respectively. Otherwise, they discard
them. Now we can calculate the difference between the
protocol 1 and the protocol 2.
III. ESTIMATION OF L1-DISTANCE BASED
ON OBSERVATIONS:
Before calculating the difference, here we introduce a
entanglement version measurement. There are several
interpretations for the quantum measurement, e.g. von
Neumann measurement scheme and Many-worlds inter-
pretation [18]. Here we are not to give a new philosophi-
cal interpretation, but to construct a physical model that
can effectively perform POVM measurement. This phys-
ical model allows us to easily find the difference between
protocol 1 and protocol 2. For briefness, here we only
take Alice’s measurement as an example. Alice’s POVM
measurement can be performed by the equipment shown
in Fig. 2. The measurement procedure is realized by an
interaction among her received state, detector and the en-
vironment. After the interaction, Alice gives up received
state and the environment and thus only holds the de-
tector, which directly gives her the classical data. After
reading out the classical data, Alice set the detector and
environment to the initial state to do the next measure-
ment. In this model we require initial states of Alice’s
detector and environment are pure and respectively to
be |de〉A and |Env〉A. For convenience, here we let |ini〉A
denote |de〉A|Env〉A. Then the interaction among the re-
ceived state, detector and environment for i-th block can
be given by
U iA =
∑
xi
|xi〉|Qxi〉A〈ini|
√
MAixi (3)
where |xi〉s are orthogonal states of detector, |Qxi〉 de-
scribes orthogonal state of the environment, 〈ini| denotes
the initial pure state of Alice’s detector and environment
and
√
MAixi is the POVM operators corresponding to
POVM element MAixi [16]. To check the validity of this
measurement, we can apply it to a two parties system
ρAB. After the interaction described by U
i
A, the state of
whole system becomes
ρABXQX = U
i
AρAB ⊗ |ini〉A〈ini|U i+A
=
∑
xi
|xi〉|Qxi〉
√
MAi+xi ρAB
∑
xj
〈xj |〈Qxj |
√
MAjxj
where QX denotes the environment and all of |Qxi〉s are
orthogonal with each other. After we trace out the sys-
tem A and environment we immediately obtain the state
ρXB =
∑
xi
|xi〉〈xi| ⊗ trA(
√
MAi+xi ρAB
√
MAixi )
We see that
trA(
√
MAi+xi ρAB
√
MAixi ) = P (x
i)ρx
i
B
where P (xi) is the probability of the out come xi and
ρx
i
B denotes Bob’s conditional state while Alice’s mea-
surement result is xi. Then ρXB becomes
ρXB =
∑
xi
P (xi)|xi〉〈xi| ⊗ ρxiB
which consists with the POVMmeasurement. Since Alice
only accept the data within the collection Ξ(X i)∪ {x′i},
we can reduce the unitary transformation given in Eq. 3
to a general quantum operation OˆiA to describe Alice’s
effective measurement, which is given by
OˆiA =
∑
xi∈Ξ(Xi)∪{x′i}
|xi〉|Qxi〉A〈ini|
√
MAixi (4)
Here we can see that OˆiA may not be a unitary transfor-
mation. The quantum operation that describes Alice’s
total N detection is
OˆAN =
l⊗
i=1
(OˆiA)
⊗ni (5)
5FIG. 2: Illustration of entanglement version measurement,
where |Env〉 and |de〉 respectively denote the initial state of
environment and the detector. The measurement can be real-
ized by the unitary operation among received state, detector
and the environment. After the operation, the received state
and the environment are given up and the measurement re-
sult can be directly given by the state of detector, denoted by
ρX .
where ni denotes the length of i-th block. By the same
way we can give the operator describing Bob’s whole N
detections (By substituting the notation A by B.).
Since we only need to consider the case that ρANBNEN
is pure, here we assume the initial state Alice and Bob
receive is |ΨANBNEN 〉. The initial state of Alice and
Bob’s detector and environment is |ΨXNY NQNXQNY 〉 =
|ini〉A|ini〉B. Then for the protocol-1, after Alice and
Bob’s measurement (general quantum operation [16]) the
state describing Alice, Bob, Eve, detectors and environ-
ment becomes
|ΨP−1〉 = |ΨXNY NANBNQN
X
QN
Y
EN 〉
=
OˆAN OˆBN |ΨANBNEN 〉|ΨXNY NQN
X
QN
Y
〉√
〈Oˆ+AN Oˆ+BN OˆAN OˆBN 〉
(6)
where X and Y denotes Alice and Bob’s detectors, QX
and QY denote the environment around Alice and Bob,
OˆBN is the operator describing Bob’s whole N detections
and 〈Oˆ+
AN
Oˆ+
BN
OˆAN OˆBN 〉 describes expectation value of
Oˆ+
AN
Oˆ+
BN
OˆAN OˆBN .
In protocol-2 Alice and Bob respectively put a dA and
dB dimensional filter before their detectors. The filter
can be described by a projection into a subspace. Here we
let the projector P dAA and P
dB
B denotes Alice and Bob’s
filters. For convenience we let P dAdBAB denotes P
dA
A ⊗P dBB .
Then for the protocol-2 after Alice and Bob’s measure-
ment the whole state becomes
|ΨP−2〉 = |Ψ˜XNY NANBNQN
X
QN
Y
EN 〉 (7)
=
OˆAN OˆBN (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗N |ΨANBNEN 〉|ΨXNY NQN
X
QN
Y
〉√
〈(P dAdBAB )⊗N Oˆ+AN Oˆ+BN OˆAN OˆBN (P dAdBAB )⊗N 〉
After tracing out received quantum state AN and BN ,
and the environment QNX and Q
N
Y we obtain the state
Alice, Bob and Eve finally hold. For the protocol-1, they
finally hold the state ρXNY NEN and for the protocol-2,
they finally share ρ˜XNY NEN . If we know the L1 distance
between ρXNY NEN and ρ˜XNY NEN we can know the dif-
ference between securities of protocol-1 and protocol-2
[1]. Since tracing out the subsystem never increases the
L1 distance [1], the L1 distance between ρXNY NEN and
ρ˜XNY NEN is no larger than that between |ΨP−1〉 and
|ΨP−2〉. We know that
|ΨANBNEN 〉 = (8)
(P dAdBAB )
⊗N |ΨANBNEN 〉+ (P dAdBAB )⊗N |ΨANBNEN 〉
where P denotes the orthogonal complement space of P .
By putting the Eq. (8) into Eq. (6) we quickly know
|ΨP−1〉 = α|ΨP−2〉+ β|Ψ′〉
where
|β| =
√
〈(P dAdBAB )⊗N Oˆ+AN Oˆ+BN OˆAN OˆBN (P dAdBAB )⊗N 〉√
〈Oˆ+
AN
Oˆ+
BN
OˆAN OˆBN 〉
.
(9)
and
|Ψ′〉 =
OˆAN OˆBN (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗N |ΨANBNEN 〉|ΨXNY NQNXQNY 〉√
〈(P dAdBAB )⊗N Oˆ+AN Oˆ+BN OˆAN OˆBN (P dAdBAB )⊗N 〉
is a state obtained from the complimentary space
(P dAdBAB )
⊗N , which may not be orthogonal with |ΨP−2〉.
From the Appendix-A of Ref. [1] we know that the L1
distance of two pure state |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉 can be given by
|||Ψ1〉 − |Ψ2〉|| = 2
√
1− |〈Ψ1|Ψ2〉|2
where ||·|| denotes the L1 distance. Then the L1 distance
between |ΨP−1〉 and |ΨP−2〉 is no larger than 2|β|, which
yields
||ρXNY NEN − ρ˜XNY NEN || ≤ 2|β|
For convenience here we let D˜ = D˜AD˜B . If we put
Eqs. (4) and (5) into Eq. (9) and apply the fact that
operators of different detectors are commutate, we can
know that
|β| =
√√√√ trABE [D˜⊗N (P dA,dBAB )⊗NρANBNEN (P dA,dBAB )⊗N ]
trABE [D˜⊗NρANBNEN ]
(10)
Now we can see that if all of pure state ρANBNEN satis-
fying Eq. (2) make |β| small enough, then protocol-1 can
be well approximated by protocol-2.
To estimate |β| here we give a very useful theorem.
Theorem 1 Let |1〉A, |2〉A, ..., and |1〉B, |2〉B, ...,
be bases of Alice and Bob’s Hilbert spaces respec-
tively, by which projectors P dAA and P
dB
B can be respec-
tively given by P dAA = |1〉A〈1| + ... + |dA〉A〈dA| and
6P dBB = |1〉B〈1| + ... + |dB〉B〈dB |. Then if we have∑∞,∞
i=1,j=dA
|A〈i|D˜A|j〉A|+
∑∞,∞
i=1,j=dB
|B〈i|D˜B|j〉B | ≤ ε3N ,
for arbitrary ρANBNEN it is always satisfied that
trAB [D˜
⊗N(P dAdBAB )⊗NρANBN (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗N ] := L ≤ ε3.
Proof : We can see that L is no larger than
max|ΨN 〉〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉, where |ΨN 〉 ∈ (P dAdBAB )⊗N . If
we expand 〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN〉 = 〈ΨN |(P dAdBAB )⊗N D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉
into product spaces P dAA (P
dA
A )
⊗N−1(P dBB )
⊗N , ...,
and do straightforward calculation, we can imme-
diately find that L ≤ N [∑∞,∞i=1,j=dA |A〈i|D˜A|j〉A| +∑∞,∞
i=1,j=dB
|B〈i|D˜B|j〉B|] ≤ ε3. (The straightforward
calculation is too bothering to show here. Detailed one
can be seen in the appendix.) 
Since trABE [D˜
⊗NρANBNEN ] ≥ ε, from Eq. (10), we
can see that Theorem 1 actually gives a sufficient condi-
tion for |β| ≤ ε.
Now, we can know the distance between protocol 1
and protocol 2 from the measurement results. The only
remained problem is to give the difference between secu-
rities of protocol-1 and protocol-2 if the state difference
of them is known.
Theorem 2 If ||ρXNY NEN − ρ˜XNY NEN || ≤ 2δ for all
ρANBNEN satisfying tr[(D˜
AD˜B)⊗NρANBNEN ] ≥ δ, then
the 5δ + ǫ-secure secret key rate of protocol-1 is no less
than the 2δ+ ǫ-secure secret key rate of protocol-2, while
Alice and Bob take results from protocol-1 as that from
protocol-2 to estimate the secret key rate of protocol-2 by
the information theoretical method.
Proof : The L1 distance cannot be increased by quan-
tum operations and thus classical bit-wise processing [1].
If ||ρXNY NEN − ρ˜XNY NEN || ≤ 2δ, then we have ||ρX¯kE¯−
ρ˜X¯kE¯ || ≤ 2δ and ||ρXNY N−ρ˜XNY N || ≤ 2δ, where X¯k, Y¯ k
and E¯ denote Alice and Bob’s classical data and Eve’s
state after the data processing respectively, during which
some information maybe announced. The security is well
defined by smooth min- and max-entropies. The amount
of ǫ-secure secret keys can be given by Hǫ
′
min(ρX¯kE¯ |E¯)−
leakIR [19], while the strength of parameter estimation
is ǫ′′′, where Hǫ
′
min(·|·) denotes the smooth min-entropy,
leakIR denotes the amount of information published dur-
ing the ǫ′′-secure reconciliation and ǫ′ + ǫ′′ + ǫ′′′ = ǫ [1].
Since ||ρX¯kE¯ − ρ˜X¯kE¯ || ≤ 2δ, the smooth min-entropy
satisfies H2δ+ǫmin (ρX¯kE¯ |E¯) ≥ Hǫmin(ρ˜X¯kE¯ |E¯) [1]. Also, if
Alice and Bob use the data from the protocol-1 as that
from the protocol-2 to estimate the state of protocol-2,
the security of the parameter estimation [1] will be re-
duced by 2δ, because ||ρXNY N − ρ˜XNY N || ≤ 2δ. Fur-
thermore, if we only consider the ρANBNEN satisfying
tr[(D˜AD˜B)⊗NρANBNEN ] ≥ δ, the strength of security
will also be reduced by δ. In all, the ǫ′ + ǫ′′ + ǫ′′′ secure
security of protocol 2 is given by Hǫ
′
min(ρ˜X¯kE¯ |E¯)−leakIR,
while the strength of parameter estimation is ǫ′′′ and
the ρ˜X¯kE¯ is estimated by the data obtained from pro-
tocol 2. The ǫ′ + ǫ′′ + ǫ′′′ + 2δ secure security of pro-
tocol 2 is given by Hǫ
′
min(ρ˜X¯kE¯ |E¯) − leakIR, while the
strength of parameter estimation is ǫ′′′ + 2δ, where the
ρ˜
X¯kE¯
is estimated by data obtained from protocol 1.
Finally the ǫ′ + ǫ′′ + ǫ′′′ + 5δ secure secret key rate of
protocol 1 can be given by H2δ+ǫ
′
min (ρX¯kE¯ |E¯) − leakIR ≥
Hǫ
′
min(ρ˜X¯kE¯ |E¯)− leakIR, while the strength of parameter
estimation is ǫ′′′+2δ, the state ρ˜
X¯kE¯
is estimated by the
data obtained from protocol 1 and only the ρANBNEN
satisfying tr[(D˜AD˜B)⊗NρANBNEN ] ≥ δ is considered.
Here the term Hǫ
′
min(ρ˜X¯kE¯ |E¯) − leakIR is amount of the
ǫ′ + ǫ′′ + ǫ′′′ + 2δ secure secrete keys of protocol 2, while
the strength of parameter estimation is ǫ′′′ + 2δ, where
2δ comes from the fact that the state ρ˜
X¯kE¯
is estimated
by the data obtained from protocol 1. 
The state distance ||ρXNY NEN − ρ˜XNY NEN || ≤ 2δ can
be evaluated from the measurement results through the-
orem 1. The security of protocol 2 is covered by current
information theoretical security proof method. Then the
the security of protocol 1 can be solved.
IV. SECURITY OF PROTOCOL 2.
If Alice and Bob’s received initial state in protocol
1 is ρANBN , the state they received in protocol 2 is
ρ˜ANBN =
1
p (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗NρANBN (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗N , where 1p is
introduced for normalization. After quantum commu-
nication, Alice and Bob will permute their state, then
ρANBN is permutation invariant. The projection oper-
ator (P dAdBAB )
⊗N commutates with the permutation op-
erator, so ρ˜ANBN is also a permutation invariant state.
The dimension of individual state of ρ˜ANBN is dAdB.
Then there is a symmetric purification for ρ˜ANBN in a
Hilbert space of dimension (dAdB)
2N , which actually is
ρ˜ANBNEN [1, 20]. Then the dimension of the individ-
ual state of ρ˜ANBNEN is (dAdB)
2. According to current
exponential de Finetti theorem, the state ρ˜ANBNEN is
close to an almost product state [21]. Then we can only
consider the collective attack. Since under the collective
attack, Eve attacks all of signals independently by the
same method, here we let ρ˜ABE denotes the state Alice,
Bob and Eve share after a single communication. Be-
fore calculating the secret key rate, we need to estimate
possible ρ˜ABE from measurement results. It should be
noted that although ρ˜ABE belongs to a Hilbert space of
dimension (dAdB)
2, we do not really need to estimate it
only in a (dAdB)
2 dimensional subspace. We can still
construct it in an infinite dimensional space, because a
state belonging to a (dAdB)
2 dimensional Hilbert space
also belongs to a infinite dimensional Hilbert space [22].
This point shows that while we discuss the collective at-
tack for protocol 2, we do not need to take the filter in
to account. If we give up filters in protocol 2, the pro-
tocol 2 becomes the same as protocol 1. Then if we do
not take the filter into account, the security against col-
lective attack of protocol 2 is actually equivalent to that
of protocol 1. Finally, our conclusion is as follows. The
security of protocol 1 can be approximated by that of
7protocol 2. For the protocol 2 we only need to consider
the collective attack. While the Hilbert space of protocol
2 is only a subspace of protocol 1, then the secrete key
rate of protocol 2 against collective attack is no less than
that of protocol 1 against collective attack. Finally, we
actually give the difference between coherent attack and
collective attack for protocol 1. We introduce the filter
only to apply current de Finetti theorem and to give the
difference between coherent attack and collective attack
for protocol 1.
The 5δ + ǫ-secure unconditional secret key rate of
protocol-1 is no less than the 2δ + ǫ-secure secret key
rate of protocol-2. Under the infinite key size case, the
unconditional secrete key rate of protocol 2 is given by
the secret key rate against collective attacks [1]. The se-
cret key rate under collective attack of protocol 2 is no
less than that of protocol 1. Also under the infinite key
size case, the parameter ǫ can approach to zero. Then
the 5δ-secure unconditional secret key rate of protocol-1
is no less than the 2δ secure unconditional secret key rate
of protocol-2 and no less than its secret key rate against
collective attacks, where 2δ comes from the fact that Al-
ice and Bob use the data of protocol 1 to estimate the
state of protocol 2. In addition, under the infinite key
size case, we may choose large enough dA and dB so as
to make δapproach to zero. Then we can directly say
that for protocol 1 if the POVM elements corresponding
to the measured results can be arbitrarily well described
in a finite dimensional space, the collective attack is op-
timal under the infinite key size case.
For many practical QKDs, the projection of POVM
elements of measured results on high dimensional basis
is extremely small. For example, the POVM element for
heterodyne detection corresponding to measured result
(p, q) is Mp,q =
1
π |p + iq〉〈p + iq|, whose component on
the photon number basis |m〉 exponentially goes to zero
as m increase. The POVM of inefficient photon number
resolving detector [23] also has similar property. Then
if a QKD protocol utilize such detectors, Alice and Bob
can announce the maximum p2+ q2 or maximum photon
number received from one pulse. Then Alice and Bob
can construct the big POVM D˜ and for a given ε
3
N they
can find a big enough d (smaller than N) that in photon
number picture satisfies
∑∞,∞
i=1,j=d |〈i|D˜|j〉| ≤ ε
3
N . Then
the difference between states of protocol 1 and protocol 2
can be smaller than 2ε. The 5ε+ ǫ-secure secret key rate
can be given by 2ε+ ǫ-secure secret key rate of protocol
2, which is covered by Ref. [1].
V. APPLICATIONS:
In the realistic case, the measured result is always fi-
nite. In heterodyne detection protocols, the maximum
value of measured result is limited. In photon number
detection protocol, the maximum received photon num-
ber is finite. Such realistic cases allow us readily apply
our results.
Here we give two application examples. We will see
that our result can be readily used for heterodyne de-
tection and photon number detection case. It should
be noted that in the following we only proved that for
CVQKD and DPSQKD the collective attack is optimal
under infinite key size case. How to prove their security
against collective attack has not been solved in this pa-
per. For short, we only take the infinite key size case
for examples. It seems that our estimation of effective
dimension is meaningless under this case. However, we
should note that under the finite key size case, the esti-
mation of effective dimension will be useful.
A. Unconditional security of CVQKD
Now we apply our results to the heterodyne detection
CVQKD and prove that as the key size goes to infinite
the collective is optimal. In the prepare & measurement
CVQKD, Alice prepare a continuous variable EPR pair,
and sends one part to Bob. Alice and Bob respectively do
heterodyne detection to their held states. The security of
such scheme against collective attack is discussed in Ref.
[9]. Here, we prove that for this protocol the collective
attack is optimal under the infinite key size case. We
denote Alice and Bob’s measurement result by (pA, qA)
and (pB, qB) respectively. The corresponding POVM el-
ements are respectively MpA,qA =
1
π |pA + iqA〉〈pA + iqA|
and MpB ,qB =
1
π |pB + iqB〉〈pB + iqB|. In a realistic sys-
tem, the maximum value of Alice and Bob’s measure-
ment results is finite (or Alice and Bob can give up some
extremely larger measurement results). Then their fi-
nal shared data is within certain region. We assume
V maxA and V
max
B are large enough, so that for all pos-
sible (pA, qA)s and (pB , qB)s Alice and Bob hold satisfy
p2A + q
2
A ≤ V maxA and p2B + q2B ≤ V maxB (or Alice and
Bob only accept the data with amplitude no larger than
V maxA and V
max
B ). Then we can construct D˜
A and D˜B
respectively to be
D˜A =
1
π
∫
p2
A
+q2
A
≤V max
A
|pA + iqA〉〈pA + iqA|dpAdqA
D˜B =
1
π
∫
p2
B
+q2
B
≤V max
A
|pB + iqB〉〈pB + iqB|dpBdqB
The filter P dAA and P
dB
B can be chosen in photon number
space. We let
P dAA = |0〉A〈0|+ |1〉A〈1|+ ...+ |dA − 1〉A〈dA − 1|
P dBB = |0〉B〈0|+ |1〉B〈1|+ ...+ |dB − 1〉B〈dB − 1|
where |i〉A〈i| and |j〉B〈j| denote the photon number
state. Now we utilize theorem 1 to discuss the difference
8between protocol 1 and protocol 2. We see that
∞,∞∑
i=0,j=dA−1
|A〈i|D˜A|j〉A|
=
1
π
∫
p2
A
+q2
A
≤V max
A
∞,∞∑
i=0,j=dA−1
|A〈i|pA + iqA〉
〈pA + iqA|j〉A|dpAdqA
= 2
∫
r2A≤V maxA
∞,∞∑
i=0,j=dA−1
riAr
j
A exp[−r2A]√
i!j!
drA
= 2
∫
r2
A
≤V max
A
∞∑
i=0
riA exp[−r2A]√
i!
∞∑
j=dA−1
rjA√
j!
drA (11)
where in the forth line we used the result that |A〈i|pA +
iqA〉| = r
i
A exp[−r2A/2]√
i!
and let r2A = p
2
A + q
2
A. Under
the case that dA ≫ V maxA , we can use the Stirling for-
mula to approximate
√
j!. Then we have
∑∞
j=dA
rjA√
j!
∝
(rA/
√
dA)
dA , which exponentially goes to zero as dA in-
creases. Then the whole term
∑∞,∞
i=0,j=dA
|A〈i|D˜A|j〉A|
will exponentially go to zero with the increase of
dA. By the same way we can prove that the term∑∞,∞
i=1,j=dB
|B〈i|D˜B|j〉B| will also exponentially goes to
zero with the increase of dB. Finally, for a given ε
3 and
large enough N , we can find a dA ≪ N and dB ≪ N ,
that satisfy
∞,∞∑
i=1,j=dA
|A〈i|D˜A|j〉A|+
∞,∞∑
i=1,j=dB
|B〈i|D˜B|j〉B| := Err ≤ ε
3
N
Then from the theorem 1 and 2 we know that the secu-
rity of this CVQKD scheme can be approximated by the
security of a scheme of dimension (dAdB)
2 ≪ N with
errors no larger than 5ε (Err exponentially approach to
zero with the increase of dA and dB , so that dA and dB
are proportional with log(N/ε3). Then for large enough
N , we can have (dAdB)
2 ≪ N). Then 5ε+ǫ-secure secret
key rate of heterodyne detection CVQKD can be given
by 2ε+ ǫ-secure secret key rate of protocol-2, where Al-
ice and Bob respectively put filters P dAA and P
dB
B before
their detectors. As N → ∞, we can find large enough
(dAdB)
2 ≪ N , that allow ε → 0, and the security pa-
rameter ǫ can goes to zero From the Ref. [1] we know
that, under the case that (dAdB)
2 ≪ N → ∞, the col-
lective attack is optimal for protocol 2 and its secret key
rate can be given by that under collective attack. Since
the secrete key rate against collective attack of protocol
2 is no larger than that of protocol 1, under the infinite
key size case the unconditional secret key rate of hetero-
dyne detection CVQKD equal to its secret key rate un-
der collective attacks and the collective is optimal. Here,
we require Alice and Bob give up such data whose am-
plitude is larger than V maxA and V
max
B . We can expect
that for large V maxA and V
max
B , the proportion of given
up data is extremely small. Such procedure only causes
extremely small change of state, and thus only cause ex-
tremely small change of security. On the other hand,
a realistic security proof for CVQKD should take such
cut off procedure into account. After all, in a realistic
situation, the maximum value of measurement results is
always finite.
B. Unconditional security of DPSQKD
Now we apply our result to coherent state DPSQKD,
whose dimension is infinite in principle. Up to now,
the security against collective attack for DPSQKD un-
der noiseless case is proved [10]. Here we show that that
proof actually is unconditional security proof. To allow
Alice and Bob do random permutation, in Ref. [10] Zhao
et al. cut the long sequence of coherent states into blocks
and regarded one block as one big state. Then Alice
and Bob can permute these big states. In the DPSQKD
Alice sends Bob a big state |ΨNb~x 〉 =
Nb⊗
i=1
|(−1)xi+1α〉 (de-
notes the state of a block), according to her binary string
~x = (x1, x2, ..., xNb), where |(−1)xi+1α〉 is a coherent
state. Then Bob measures the phase difference between
each two individual state. The collective attack means
Eve attack these big states (blocks) independently with
the same method. Here we require Bob use the pho-
ton number resolving detector. After many rounds of
quantum communications, Bob announces the maximum
photon number received from one big state (one block).
Then if Bob put a filter that filters out all the state whose
photon number is larger than certain criteria, the mea-
sured results should not change too much.
We see that if the efficiency of photon number resolv-
ing detector is 100%, then we can definitely know the
actual dimension of Bob’s received state. However, if
that efficiency is not 100%, we cannot determine the ex-
act dimension of Bob’s state from the measured photon
numbers.
Here we discuss the imperfect detector case. In Ref.
[24], the POVM element of ineffective photon number re-
solving detector is given. In that reference, the spacial
mode of received photon state has not been considered. If
we take the spacial mode and other components into ac-
count, we can extend that POVM element corresponding
to n photons to be
Πn =
∞∑
m=n
Cnmγ
n(1− γ)m−nPm (12)
where γ denotes detector efficiency and Pm denotes the
projector to m photon number subspace. We assume the
dimension of m photon number subspace is fm, and Pm
to be
Pm =
fm∑
k=1
|ϕmk 〉〈ϕmk | (13)
9where |ϕmk 〉 denotes the orthogonal state of m photon
number subspace. It can be prove that fm ≤ l(m + l −
1)!/m!, where l denotes the block size.
If Bob’s maximum received photon number is n0, then
the POVM element corresponding to this event can be
given by
D˜B =
n=n0∑
n=0
Πn (14)
In DPSQKD, if the block size is l, the dimension of Alice’s
modulation is 2l, which is finite. Therefore we only need
to discuss Bob’s state. We can construct Bob’s filter to
be
P dBB =
m=m0∑
m=0
Pm
where Pm is given by Eq. (13). Now we can use theo-
rem 1 to estimate the difference between protocol 1 and
protocol 2. We enumerate the basis of the filter by |ϕmk 〉.
Then we have
Diff :=
∑
m=0,m′=m0,k,k′
〈ϕmk |D˜B|ϕm
′
k′ 〉 (15)
≤
n0∑
n=0
γn
∑
m=m0
Cnm(1− γ)m−nl(m+ l − 1)!/m!
≤
n0∑
n=0
γn
∑
m=m0
(1− γ)m−nl/n!(m+ l − 1)l+n−1
where in the second line we have used Eqs. (12), (13) and
(14) and the fact that fm ≤ l(m+ l − 1)!/m! and in the
third line we used the fact thatm(m−1)...(m−n) ≤ mn.
It can be seen that Diff exponentially goes to zero as
m0 increases. Then for a given security parameter we
can find a large enough key size N that gives the required
security.
It also can be seen that if Bob use the perfect photon
number resolving detector or a detector that can given
the upper bound of the number of received photons (e.g.
bourn up if received photon number is too high), then
they can find a protocol 2 that is exactly same as protocol
1. Then we can immediately get a conclusion that the
collective attack is optimal under the infinite key size
case.
VI. CONCLUSION:
In the above we give a method to apply current expo-
nential de Finetti theorem to realistic QKD. In realistic
QKD, the number of Alice and Bob received photons is
always finite and their measurement results always be-
long to a finite region. This property allow us effectively
describe the QKD protocol in a finite dimensional sub-
space with sufficiently small error. In this paper, we in-
troduce another finite dimensional protocol by putting
finite dimensional filters before the detectors, and shown
the security difference between the original unknown-
dimensional protocol and this finite dimensional proto-
col based on measurement results. Since the security of
that finite dimensional protocol is covered by current in-
formation theoretical security proof method, the security
of a realistic unknown dimensional system can be solved.
Our result can be used to prove the unconditional se-
curity of heterodyne detection CVQKD and DPSQKD.
Finally, we prove that for heterodyne detection CVQKD
and DPSQKD collective attack is optimal under the infi-
nite key size case. The difference between protocol 1 and
protocol 2 will be meaningful if we consider the finite key
size case.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED PROOF FOR
THEOREM 1
At first we can see that
trAB[D˜
⊗N (P dAdBAB )⊗NρANBN (P
dAdB
AB )
⊗N ] is no larger
than max|ΨN 〉〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉 where |ΨN〉 ∈ (P dAdBAB )⊗N .
To find max|ΨN 〉〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN〉, we need to ex-
pand the space (P dAdBAB )
⊗N by product spaces
P dAA (P
dA
A )
⊗N−1(P dBB )
⊗N , .... Here, we let P dAAk (P
dB
Bk
)
denote the projector to Alice’s (Bob’s) k-th state.
Also we distinguish bases of k-th state of Alice (Bob)
as |1〉Ak , |2〉Ak , ..., (|1〉Bk , |2〉Bk , ...). We know that
IAk = P
dA
Ak
+ P dAAk and IBk = P
dA
Bk
+ P dABk , where IAk and
IBk are the identity matrixes corresponding to Alice and
Bob’s k-th states. Then we have
〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉 = 〈ΨN |(P dAA1 + P dAA1 )D˜⊗N |ΨN〉
= 〈ΨN |P dAA1 D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉+ 〈ΨN |P dAA1 D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉
= C1F + C
1
L (A1)
where C1F and C
1
L respectively denote the first and second
term in the second line. Since
P dAA1 = |dA + 1〉A1〈dA + 1|+ |dA + 2〉A1〈dA + 2|+ ...
IA1 = |1〉A1〈1|+ |2〉A1〈2|+ ...
the C1F can be given by
C1F = 〈ΨN |P dAA1 D˜⊗NIA1 |ΨN 〉 (A2)
=
∞,∞∑
m1=dA+1,m′1=1
〈m1|D˜A|m′1〉 ·
〈ΨN |m1〉(D˜A)⊗N−1(D˜B)⊗N 〈m′1|ΨN 〉
where we have used the fact that P dAAk and D˜
A
j and D˜
B
j are
commutate if k 6= j and D˜Aj and D˜Bj denote POVM ele-
ments corresponding to j-th state. We know there exist
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two pure states |Φm11 〉 and |Φ˜m
′
1
1 〉 that can let 〈m′1|ΨN 〉
and 〈m1|ΨN〉 be written as 〈m1|ΨN 〉 = λ1|Φm11 〉 and
〈m′1|ΨN 〉 = λ′1|Φ˜m
′
1
1 〉, where |λ1| ≤ 1 and |λ′1| ≤ 1. Then
C1F can be given by
C1F = 〈ΨN |P dAA1 D˜⊗NIA1 |ΨN〉 (A3)
= λ1λ
′
1
∞,∞∑
m1=dA+1,m′1=1
〈m1|D˜A|m′1〉 ·
〈Φm11 |(D˜A)⊗N−1(D˜B)⊗N |Φ˜m
′
1
1 〉
Before giving the upper bound to C1F , we will discuss
the upper bound of |〈Φm11 |(D˜A)⊗N−1(D˜B)⊗N |Φ˜m
′
1
1 〉|. It
is known that arbitrary POVM elementM can be written
into a diagonal form. We assume an arbitrary M can be
written as
M = a1|ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|+ a2|ϕ2〉〈ϕ2|+ ...
where |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, ...are orthogonal bases, and a1, a2, ... are
positive real numbers and satisfy ai ≤ 1. We let |ψ〉
and |ψ′〉 are two arbitrary states. Now we consider the
following value for |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉.
|〈ψ|M |ψ′〉| = |a1〈ψ|ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|ψ′〉+ a2〈ψ|ϕ2〉〈ϕ2|ψ′〉+ ...|
From the fact that
|〈ψ|ϕ1〉|2 + |〈ψ|ϕ2〉|2 + ... ≤ 1 (A4)
|〈ψ′|ϕ1〉|2 + |〈ψ′|ϕ2〉|2 + ... ≤ 1
we know that for arbitrary states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 and POVM
element M , it is always satisfied that
|〈ψ|M |ψ′〉| ≤
√
|a1〈ψ|ϕ1〉|2 + |a2〈ψ|ϕ2〉|2 + ...(A5)
≤
√
|〈ψ|ϕ1〉|2 + |〈ψ|ϕ2〉|2 + ... ≤ 1
where in the first line we applied the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality which says that
|a1b1 + a2b2 + ...| ≤√
|a1|2 + |a2|2 + ...
√
|b1|2 + |b2|2 + ...
and in the second line we applied Eq. (A4) and the fact
that ai ≤ 1.
Now we put Eq. (A5) into Eq. (A3) and obtain
|C1F | ≤
∞,∞∑
m1=dA+1,m′1=1
|〈m1|D˜A|m′1〉| (A6)
By the same way C1L can be given by
C1L = 〈ΨN |P dAA1 D˜⊗N |ΨN〉
= 〈ΨN |P dAA1 P dAA2 D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉+ 〈ΨN |P dAA1 P dAA2 D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉
= C2F + C
2
L
where C2F and C
2
L respectively denote the first and the
second term in the second line.
As the C1F , the C
2
F can be rewritten as
C2F = 〈ΨN |P dAA1 P dAA2 D˜⊗NIA2 |ΨN 〉
=
∞,∞∑
m2=dA+1,m′2=1
〈m2|D˜A|m′2〉 ·
〈ΨN |m2〉P dAA1 (D˜A)⊗N−1(D˜B)⊗N 〈m′2|ΨN〉(A7)
Also there exist a pure state |Φm22 〉 by which
〈ΨN |m2〉P dAA1 can be written as λ2〈Φm22 | and a pure state
|Φ˜m
′
2
2 〉 by which 〈m′2|ΨN 〉 can be given by λ′2|Φ˜m
′
2
2 〉. Since
|λ1| ≤ 1 and |λ2| ≤ 1, from the Eqs. (A5) and (A7) we
know that
|C2F | ≤
∞,∞∑
m2=dA+1,m′2=1
|〈m2|D˜A|m′2〉| (A8)
If we continuously do such procedure, we will find that
〈ΨN |(D˜AD˜B)⊗N |ΨN 〉 =
2N∑
i=1
CiF + C
2N
L (A9)
and
|CiF | ≤
∞,∞∑
mi=dA+1,m′i=1
|〈mi|D˜A|m′i〉| (A10)
for i ≤ N , and
|CiF | ≤
∞,∞∑
mi=dB+1,m′i=1
|〈mi|D˜B|m′i〉| (A11)
for i > N , where
C2NL = 〈ΨN |(P dAdBAB )⊗N D˜⊗N |ΨN〉 = 0 (A12)
and we have applied the fact that |ΨN〉 ∈ (P dAdBAB )⊗N .
Finally from Eqs. (A9), (A10) (A11) and (A12) we can
see that
|〈ΨN |D˜⊗N |ΨN 〉| ≤
2N∑
i=1
|CiF | (A13)
≤ N [
∞,∞∑
i=1,j=dA
|A〈i|D˜A|j〉A|+
∞,∞∑
i=1,j=dB
|B〈i|D˜B|j〉B|]
Since Eq. (A13) holds for arbitrary |ΨN 〉 ∈ (P dAdBAB )⊗N ,
the Theorem 1 is proved.
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